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I.

YUAN*

Introduction

The first section of this survey of developments during 2009 examines significant U.S.
court decisions of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two noteworthy decisions construing

the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Court clarified in ArthurAndersen LLP v. Carlisle
that the FAA does not bar a non-party to an arbitration agreement from moving to compel
arbitration in reliance on that agreement' and held in Vaden v. Discover Bank that a federal

court in determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to compel
arbitration must "look through" the motion to determine whether it would have jurisdiction over the parties' actual controversy. 2 Several circuit courts reached different conclusions concerning when arbitration and choice-of-law clauses are invalid under U.S. public
policy.

A number of significant cases dealt with enforcement of arbitration awards. The Second Circuit held that personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction is required to confirm a foreign
arbitral award pursuant to the New York Convention.3 In other decisions, courts addressed the scope of arbitrators' authority to make awards, as well as courts' jurisdiction to
confirm awards that go beyond issues submitted to the arbitrators. Circuit courts continued to be divided over the question of whether "manifest disregard of the law" remained a
viable ground for vacatur of arbitral awards following the Supreme Court's decision in
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, with a majority of circuit courts recognizing its continuing
viability. Finally, a number of courts held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 does not permit discov* Part II of this article on Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts was written by Steven Smith, partner
of O'Melveny & Myers LLP and chair of the firm's International Dispute Resolution Practice Group, along
with Ivana Cingel, Robin Devaux, Grant Gelberg, SpencerJones, and Justin Mates, who are all attorneys with
O'Melveny & Myers LLP. Part III of this article (on Investor-State Disputes) was written by Sobia Haque,
Ian Laird, Kassi Tallent, Baiju Vasani, Marguerite Walter and Howard Yuan. They are all attorneys in the
International Dispute Resolution Group of Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.
1. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carshlle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
2. Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009).
3. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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ery in aid of international private arbitrations, despite contrary decisions from other
courts.
The second section of this survey looks at major developments from 2009 in the field of
investment treaty arbitration. A major focus of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals and committees this year-as in past years-was
on the nature of qualifying investments under the ICSID Convention. In this regard,
most tribunals moved away from a doctrinal approach, such as the one embodied in the
so-called "Salini test." The PhoenixAction decision was a notable exception, with arbitrators applying a six-factor test to disqualify the claimant's investment from protection
under the ICSID Convention. In a related development, the Malaysian HistoricalSalvors
ad hoc committee annulled the award partly because the tribunal inappropriately elevated
certain characteristics of qualifying investments to the level of jurisdictional requirements
under the Convention.4
In the realm of merits decisions, the pendulum swung slightly back from fair and equitable treatment (FET), and towards expropriation as the most popular basis for liability.
The NAFTA tribunal in the Glamis case determined, in contrast to several past tribunals,
that the customary international law standard of FET was distinguishable from the treatybased standard, and that the former had not evolved since the 1926 Neer decision.5
In other developments, a number of ad hoc committees wrestled with Argentina's noncompliance with its payment obligations under Article 53 of the Convention. And the
Renta 4 tribunal issued a notable decision finding that the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
clause in the Spain-Russia bilateral investment treaty (BIT) could be viewed as an expansion of Russia's consent to arbitration based on more liberal jurisdictional provisions in
other treaties.6
II.
A.

Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION

CLAUSES

1. Invocation of Arbitration Clauses by Non-Parties
In ArthurAndersen LLP v. Carlisle,the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether (1) the
courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from the denial of a motion by a non-party
to an arbitration agreement to stay litigation pursuant to FAA § 3, and (2) a non-party to
an arbitration agreement may invoke the protections of § 3.7 The dispute arose when
8
Arthur Andersen referred plaintiffs to another firm to design a tax shelter strategy. After
the strategy failed and plaintiff filed suit, Arthur Andersen invoked the arbitration clauses
9
in the agreements between plaintiffs and the other firm.
4. Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, Decision on Application for Annulment, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10 (Apr. 16, 2009).
5. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, Ad hoc-UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (May 14, 2009).
6. Renta 4 S.V.S.A. v. Russ. Fed'n, Award on Preliminary Objections, Arbitration V (024-2007), 1 122
(Mar. 20, 2009).
7. Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. at 1899.
8. Id. at 1899.
9. Id. at 1900.
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The district court denied Arthur Andersen's motion to stay the litigation, and the Sixth
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal.' 0 The Supreme Court held
that the FAA's "clear and unambiguous terms" granted any litigant the right to appeal the
denial of a stay, regardless of whether the party met the substantive § 3 requirements."
The Court reasoned that lower courts, as well as the dissent, conflated the jurisdictional
question with the merits issue of whether a non-party to an arbitration agreement is entitled to a stay under § 3.12 The Court further held that while § 2 of the FAA requires a
written arbitration agreement, state contract law controlled which contracts are enforceable and, in turn, whether a non-party may enforce the agreement under traditional theo13
ries of contract law, such as equitable estoppel or alter ego.
2.

Jurisdiction to Compel Arbitration Under the FAA

Recognizing that the FAA does not provide an independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court in Vaden v. Discover Bank held that a federal court
must "look through" a motion to compel arbitration to determine whether it would have
4
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute between the parties.' In Vaden, the actual controversy related to the collection of credit-card debt, a claim that did not arise under
federal law.' 5 That federal law preempted the debtor's counterclaim did not change the
analysis because jurisdiction must be predicated on the allegations in the complaint and
6
not the preemption of a state-based counterclaim or defense.'
3. Arbitration Clauses and the Potential Waiver of U.S. Statutory Claims
In 2009, several courts reached different conclusions about how the presence of statutory causes of action impacted an agreement to arbitrate. The plaintiff in Thomas v. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. brought statutory and common-law claims following injuries he
8
sustained while working on a cruise ship.' 7 Carnival sought to compel arbitration.'
Panamaapply
that
would
forum
a
foreign
in
arbitration
that
compelling
Plaintiff argued
nian law constituted a prospective waiver of his statutory claims in violation of public

policy.'

9

20
Relying on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court

held that when paired with a foreign choice-of-law provision, the arbitration clause pre2
vented plaintiff from vindicating his statutory rights. 1
In Mitsubishi, the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitration of a Sherman Act antitrust
claim did not violate public policy but noted "that in the event the choice-of-forum and
10. Id. at 1900-01.
11. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (1990) ("[aln appeal may be taken from-[ ]an order-[ ]refusing a stay
of any action under section 3 of this title.")).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1902.
14. Vaden, 129 S. Cr. at 1273.
15. Id. at 1272.
16. Id. at 1279.
17. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2009).
18. Id. at 1115.
19. Id.
20. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
21. Thomas. 573 F.3d at 1120-21.
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choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy." 22 Applying this language, the Thomas court
denied the motion to compel, holding that arbitration could deprive plaintiff of the benefit of his statutory claim. 23
In Grynbergv. BP P.L.C., the Court analyzed the same section of Mitsubishi and reached
a contrary result.24 The parties commenced arbitration in Canada under Alberta law. 25
While the arbitration was pending, plaintiffs filed suit in Washington, D.C., alleging
RICO violations. 26 In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs cited Mitsubishi and argued that arbitration in Canada under Alberta law was barred by public policy.
The Court concluded that Mitsubishi's language was dicta and that the forum-selection
clause was presumptively enforceable because the agreement was "international in character." 27 Further, plaintiffs' RICO claims could be vindicated as "conspiracy, fraud, bribery,
and theft" claims under Alberta law. 28
The Second Circuit, in In re American Express Merchants Litigation, relied on Mitsubishi
in concluding that an arbitration clause that included a class-action waiver was void on
public policy grounds. 29 The Court determined that precluding collective action granted
American Express "de facto immunity" from liability under the Sherman Act because
prosecuting the claims on an individual basis was cost prohibitive. 30
B. ENFORCEMENT OF AwARDs
1. PersonalJurisdiction and Enforcement of Awards Against Sovereigns
In FronteraResources Azerbasjan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbajan Republic, the Second
Circuit held that personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction is required to confirm a foreign
arbitral award. 31 Responding to the argument that there is no statutory or treaty basis for
such a requirement and that the New York Convention requires a court to confirm an
award "unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal. . . of recognition or enforcement"
specified therein, the court held that the Convention "limits the ways in which one can
challenge a request for confirmation, but it does nothing to alter the fundamental require32
ment of jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement is being sought."
The court also held that foreign states are not "persons" for the purposes of the Due
Process Clause and are thus not entitled to its jurisdictional protections. 33 Even though
an instrumentality or agency of a foreign state would be deemed a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA, such statutory treatment "does not answer the constitutional question
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123-24.
Grynburg v. BP P.L.C., 596 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2009).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 80.
In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 319-20 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 320.
Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer., 582 F.3d 393, 397-98 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399-401.
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34

If the foreign state "exerted sufficient control over
[the entity]... to make it an agent of the State, then there is no reason to extend to [the
35
entity] a constitutional right that is denied to the sovereign itself." The court concluded
that the analytic framework to be applied to determine "whether the instrumentality
should have due process rights to which the state is not entitled" is the same as that applied to determine whether an instrumentality can be treated like its state for purposes of
attribution of liability. 36
In United States v. ParkPlace Associates, Ltd., a case with an unusual and complex procedural history, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an award subject to the domestic chapter of the
FAA could neither be vacated, because none of the vacatur requirements of 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a) were met, nor confirmed, because the action to confirm was barred on sovereign
immunity grounds.37 There, Park Place entered into a Joint Venture Agreement OVA)
with LCP Associates (LCP) providing that disputes were to be resolved by arbitration and
that any judgment on the award could be rendered "in any court of competent jurisdiction
in the State of California." 38 LCP's majority interest was subsequently forfeited to the
United States.39
Park Place sought to enforce its award against the United States in the Court of Federal
Claims. 40 The United States opposed the action and moved to vacate the award in the
Central District of California. 4i After the Federal Circuit confirmed the denial of Park
Place's motion to confirm on the ground that authority to decide such motions is vested
exclusively in the district courts and that the JVA provided that judgment on the award
could be rendered in California courts, Park Place successfully moved to confirm the
42
award in the Central District of California. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
holding that the United States failed to
to
vacate,
motion
of
the
denial
Central District's
meet the vacatur requirements of 9 U.S.C. § 10,43 but vacated the confirmation of the
award because the United States had not waived immunity to confirmation.The Ninth Circuit rejected Park Place's arguments that the United States had waived
immunity both by assuming ownership of LCP's interest and assenting to the JVA and by
filing a motion to vacate. 45 The court concluded that its holding "essentially return[ed]
Park Place to the Court of Federal Claims," even though the Federal Circuit already held
4
"that neither it nor the Court of Federal Claims may confirm the arbitration award." 6
While the court expressed sympathy for Park Place's jurisdictional predicament, it noted
of [the entity's] due process rights."

34. Id. at 400.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Park Place Assoc., 563 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2009).
38. Id. at 913.
39. Id. at 914.
40. Id. at 915.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 917-18.
43. Id. at 935.
44. Id. at 932-934.
45. Id. at 919-20, 923.
46. Id. at 936.
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that "a suit against the United States must start from the opposite assumption that no
relief is available." 47
2. U.S. Decisions Addressing the Scope of Arbitrators'and Courts' Authority
4
In ReliaStar Life Insurance Co. v. EMC National Life Co., 8 the Second Circuit held that
arbitrators could award fees as sanctions for bad faith conduct, even where the parties'
agreement required each party to bear its own fees.49 ReliaStar and National Travelers
entered into two coinsurance agreements, each of which contained an identical agreement
to arbitrate and provided that each party would bear its own arbitrator's and attorneys'
fees. 50 National Travelers initiated arbitration seeking a declaration that the coinsurance
agreements had been terminated.5 ' The arbitration panel issued an award in ReliaStar's
favor and ordered National Travelers to pay ReliaStar's arbitrator and attorneys' fees because it viewed National Travelers' conduct during the arbitration "as lacking good
faith." 52
The Southern District of New York vacated the award on the ground that the panel had
exceeded its authority in awarding fees and costs.5 3 The Second Circuit reversed, finding
that a broad arbitration clause-like the one at issue in that case-"confers inherent authority on arbitrators to sanction a party that participates in the arbitration in bad faith,
and that such a sanction may include an award of attorney's or arbitrator's fees."s4 The
court stated that a challenged award would be upheld as long as the arbitrator had offered
"a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached." 55 The court noted there was
no indication that the parties intended to limit the arbitrators' authority to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct and that the parties' agreement indicated the intention to have
the arbitrators follow the "American Rule," with each side bearing its fees and costs, only
6
where there is good faith conduct.5
In KX Reinsurance Co. v. General Reinsurance Corp., the court addressed whether the
57
arbitral panel's jurisdiction continued beyond its issuance of the final award. KX had
entered into several reinsurance treaties containing arbitration clauses with General Reinsurance and North Star Reinsurance. 5 North Star and General initiated arbitration to
collect money they contended was owed to them.59 The panel found in favor of North
Star and General and issued an interim order requiring KX to post a letter of credit for

47. Id. at 935.
48. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat'1 Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
49. Id. at 83.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 85.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 86.
55. Id. (quoting Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.

2003)).
56. Id. at 88-89.

57. KX Reinsurance Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., No. 08 Civ. 7807(SAS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92717, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2008).
58. Id. at *3.
59. Id. at *3-4.
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61
outstanding balances and reserves. 60 KX agreed to do so. The panel then converted the
interim order into a provision of the final award, which included the right to retain jurisdiction over any remaining claims concerning the reinsurance treaties until all parties expressly requested that it desist.62 KX complied with the arbitral award, moved to confirm
the award except for the provision permitting retention of jurisdiction (which it sought to
63
vacate) and requested that the panel be disbanded. North Star and General opposed,
64
and the panel rejected KX's request that it disband.
65
The court granted KX's motion in its entirety. After determining that the arbitral
award was indeed final, the court found no reason under the FAA not to confirm the
award in part, as KX requested. 66 The court also held that the panel had no right to retain
to it; thus, "by definijurisdiction, as it had already ruled on the specific issues submitted
67
tion, it ha[d] no jurisdiction over any potential future disputes." Accordingly, KX's motion to vacate the portion of the panel's award enabling it to retain jurisdiction over
68
potential future disputes was also granted.
The scope of a court's jurisdiction to enforce an award was addressed in Four Seasons
Hotels &sResorts v. Consorcio Barr.69 Four Seasons sought to confirm an arbitral award
70
conducted pursuant to the New York Convention. The Southern District of Florida
not
be imputed into a new agreement
determined that an arbitration agreement could
that, while related to the prior agreement, explicitly superseded it.71 Specifically, a Hotel
Management Agreement between the parties contained an arbitration provision, but a
later Loan Agreement superseded relevant portions of the Hotel Management Agreement,
72
including the arbitration provision. Accordingly, the court agreed with Consorcio's
contention that the court lacked jurisdiction to confirm a final arbitral award in Four
Seasons' favor "inasmuch as it award[ed] damages for claims under the Loan Agreement." 73 Because the Loan Agreement lacked an arbitration provision, the court found
the portion of the arbitral award relating to that Agreement to be outside the terms of the
74
submission to arbitration.

3. Status of "Manfest Disregardof the Law" Following Hall Street
One of the most significant developments in 2008 was the Supreme Court's decision in
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., which held that parties to an arbitration agree60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. at *3-5.
62. Id. at *6-7.

63. Id. at *8.
64. Id.at *6-9.

65. Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *15-16.
67. Id. at *19-20.
68. Id. at *20.
69. Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364 (S.D. Fla.
2009).
70. Id. at 1366.
71. Id. at 1388.
72. Id. at 1368-69.
73. Id. at 1369.
74. Id.
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ment may not contract for broader judicial review of arbitral awards than that provided for
in the FAA.7s The Court's decision questioned whether judicially created grounds not
expressly set forth in the FAA, including manifest disregard of the law and complete irrationality, continued to be valid grounds for vacatur. 76 This question will likely depend on
whether these grounds are deemed extra-statutory-which would call their viability into
doubt-or whether they instead refer collectively to the grounds set forth in § 10 of the
FAA, or are merely shorthand for, or a gloss on, FAA §§ 10(a)( 3 )-(4), which authorize
77
vacatur when the arbitrators are "guilty of misconduct" or "exceed[] their powers." The
Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue and circuit courts are divided. The Second
Circuit has affirmed the continued viability of "manifest disregard" on the statutory
"shorthand" theory, indicating that this standard is a "judicial gloss on the specific
8
79
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA."78 The Ninth and Sixth o
circuits have likewise held that "manifest disregard" remains a viable ground for vacatur,
while the Tenth Circuit has applied the standard without squarely addressing its continued
viability under Hall Street.8 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that it is no longer a
viable ground. 82 The First Circuit stated in dicta in one opinion that Hall Street abolished
"manifest disregard" but in a subsequent opinion vacated an award based on the manifest
83
disregard standard without discussing Hall Street
4. Other Enforcement Decisions
The Ninth Circuit addressed the "manifest disregard" and "complete irrationality"
standards for vacatur in Bosack v. Soward.84 Following a dispute between the parties, the
arbitral panel entered a series of five interim awards and a Final Award.85 In one interim
award, the panel determined the value of Soward's interest in a particular partnership on
the basis that he remained a partner in the partnership. 86 In a subsequent interim award,
the panel premised the imposition of punitive damages on findings that Soward had been
87
removed as a partner years before.
Appellants moved to vacate the panel's punitive damages awards,88 arguing that they
were irreconcilable with findings made in previous awards and thus violated the functus
officio doctrine, and also that they were completely irrational in manifest disregard of the
75. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1396 (2008).
76. Id. at 1398-99.
77. Id. at 1404.
78. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2793 (2009).
79. See Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).

80. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 2008 WL 4899478, at *1(6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2008).
81. See DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009).
82. See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
83. Compare Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008), with Kashner Davidson Sec.
Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 79 (1st Cir. 2008).
84. Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 1101.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1102.
88. Id.
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law. 89 While tacitly recognizing the contradictory factual findings in the panel's awards,
the Ninth Circuit upheld them, reasoning that an arbitral award may be vacated as in
manifest disregard of the law only if it is clear from the record that the panel recognized
the applicable law, yet ignored it-a showing that the court ruled had not been made. 90
The court determined that the award did not "fail to draw its essence from the agreement"9 ' between the parties, and thus was not completely irrational because the panel had
applied Delaware law rather than the parties' agreement in establishing the tort liability
on which punitive damages were based.92 Finally, the court followed the Eighth Circuit in
ruling that the functus officio doctrine applies to final partial (or interim) awards, but found
93
that the panel had not re-determined any findings made in the only final interim award.

C.

AVAILABILrY OF DISCOVERY IN AID OF ARBITRATION-28

U.S.C. § 1782

Recent Fifth Circuit and district court decisions indicate that no consensus yet exists on
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes district courts to compel discovery "for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal," 94 can be used to obtain evidence in aid
of international private arbitrations. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,95 several district courts have held that a foreign private arbitration panel qualified as a "tribunal" for purposes of § 1782.96 But in El Paso
Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva HidroelectricaDel Rio Lempa, the Fifth Circuit explained that
97
whether § 1782 applied to private arbitrations was not squarely addressed in Intel. The
court held that Intel did not disturb earlier precedent holding that § 1782 does not reach
discovery sought for use in international private arbitrations. 98 District courts in In re
Operadora DB Mexico, S.A. DE C.K99 and In re Arbitration in London, England'0 followed
similar reasoning in rejecting applications fof discovery under

§

1782.

M. Investor-State Disputes
A.

JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILIFY

1. Investor Standing
In one of the more significant decisions dealing with investor standing, the tribunal in
Renta 4101 addressed an objection to its jurisdiction on the basis that two of the claim89. Id.
90. Id. at 1104.
91. Id. at 1106.
92. Id. at 1107.
93. Id. at 1103.
7 82
(a) (2006).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
generally
Intel
95. See
96. See, e.g., In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass. 2008).
97. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, No. 08-20771, 2009 WL
2407189, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009).
98. Id. at *3.
99. In re Operadora DB Mex., S.A. DE C.V., 2009 WL 2423138, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009).
100. In re an Arbitration in London, Eng. between Norfolk S. Corp., Norfolk S. Ry. Co., & Gen. Sec. Ins.
Co. & Ace Bermuda, 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. 1l. June 15, 2009).
101. Renta 4, supra note 6, 1 122.

SPRING 2010

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

122

ants-investment funds owning Yukos Oil Company American Depository Receipts-did
not meet the requirement of the Spain-Russia BIT that an "investor" be a "corporate
02
body" (persona juridica).1
The funds were operating under a tripartite Spanish investalso
involved management and depository companies. While the latment structure that
ter companies were potentially qualified investors, they had no right to bring the claims in
03
question themselves, because they did not technically make the investments.
2.

Qualifing Investments

The existence of a qualifying investment continued to be a prominent issue in investorstate arbitration in 2009, particularly in the context of the so-called "Salini test."'0 There
was a clear effort on the part of tribunals to take a fact-based, rather than a doctrinal,
approach to what constitutes a qualifying investment. For example, the tribunal in TotoUS
emphasized that it sought to analyze the characteristics of the investment in a manner
06
appropriate to the specific facts of that case.
The RSMo7 tribunal determined that the Salini elements were not cumulative, noting
that agreements to explore for natural resources may involve a significant commitment
and outlay of investor resources without entailing a regular return or contribution to the
development of the host state.' 08
The tribunal in Pantechniki likewise rejected the notion that the Salini factors constituted a test, suggesting that there was an "emerging synthesis" in ICSID jurisprudence
and scholarship that eliminated two of those factors, namely, the requirements of duration
and contribution to the development of the host state.109
On the other hand, the Phoenix Action tribunal seemed to take a more doctrinal approach to what constitutes a qualifying investment, summarizing what it deemed to be the
"requirements for an investment to benefit from the international protection of ICSID" in
0
the form of a list constituting six "elements [that] have to be taken into account.""1 Al-

though the tribunal stated that these factors had to be analyzed "with due consideration of
all circumstances,""' it proceeded to apply them in systematic fashion.112
102. Id. '1 127-130. The third arbitrator dissented on this holding. See 1 25-32 (separate opinion of
Charles N. Brower).
103. Renta 4, supra note 6, T 132.
104. Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/4,
1 14 (July 23, 2001).
105. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Leb., Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
07/12, 1 65, 69 (Sept. 8, 2009).
106. Id. T 81.
107. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Gren., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/14 (Mar. 13, 2009).

9J243-244.
109. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng'r v. Alb., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/07/21, T 36
(July 30, 2009).
110. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/06/5, %114 (Apr. 15,
2009).
108. Id.

111. Id.
112. Id.

1 115.
91117-144.

VOL. 44, NO. 1

COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

123

3. Most Favored Nation Clauses
The use of MFN clauses to expand the scope of applicable dispute resolution provisions
continued to be a contentious issue in 2009. The Renta 4 tribunal examined claimants'
argument that, by operation of the MFN provision in the Spain-Russia BIT, they could
rely upon the jurisdictional provision in the Denmark-Russia BIT, which was considerably
broader than the jurisdictional provision in the former treaty." 3 Citing the Ambatielos
Claim, the tribunal found that the MFN clause in the Spain-Russia BIT evidenced Russia's
consent to expand jurisdiction based on more liberal provisions in other treaties, even
4
where such treaties were entered into later in time."
In contrast, the Tza Yap Shum tribunal found that the MFN provision in the PeriChina BIT did not grant it jurisdiction to hear claims of violations of FET and full protection and security where the BIT specifically provided ex-ante consent only for submission
of claims of expropriation to ICSID arbitration.115
4. Rule 41(5): Oljection That a Claim Is Manifestly Without Legal Merit
In Brandes," 6 the tribunal heard an objection to jurisdiction brought under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5), which provides for expedited consideration of an objection that a
claim is "manifestly without legal merit" and agreed with the tribunal in Trans-Globall7
that the word "manifest" required that the deficiency be clear and obvious. 18 Moreover,
the Brandes tribunal found that the absence of a factual basis for the claim was insufficient
to sustain an objection under the rule,"l 9 ultimately rejecting respondent's objection on
the grounds that it would require an examination of complex legal and factual issues.1
B.

20

DECISIONS ON THE MERITS

The requirement for expropriation with compensation was the main ground of all three
merits decisions rendered in favor of claimants in 2009, while FET was a partial basis for
liability in only one decision.121
113. Renta 4, supra note 6, 69.
114. Id. 1 101.
115. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/07/6, T 199 (June
19, 2009).
116. Brandes Inv. Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., Decision on Respondent's Objection
Under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/08/3, 1 73 (Feb. 2,
2009).
117. Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Decision on the Respondent's Objection Under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/07/25 (May 12,
2008).
63-64.
118. Brandes, supra note 116,

119. Id.

70.

120. Id. 1 71-72.
121. Claimants succeeded in full or part on the merits in three arbitrations in 2009: Funnekotter v. Zimb.,
Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/6 (Apr. 15, 2009) (expropriation); Siag & Vecchi v. Egypt,
Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/15 (May 11, 2009) (expropriation, full protection and security,
FET, unreasonable measures); and Saipem SpA v. Bangl., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/7
(June 20, 2009) (expropriation). Respondents successfully defended liability claims in four arbitrations in
2009: Glamis, supra note 5; Pantechniki, supra note 109; Bayindir Insant Turism Ticaret ve Sanayi A S v.
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1. Expropriation
The claimants in Funnekotterl22 were faced with a situation involving direct and indirect
land expropriations as a result of, inter alia, laws permitting the taking of farming properties for transfer to military veterans and other nationals. Unlike most expropriation cases,
the main issue was not whether there was an expropriation, but whether compensation
had been paid "without delay," as required by the treaty.123 Although the claimants alleged that none of the cumulative requirements for a legal expropriation were met by
Zimbabwe, the tribunal concluded there was an illegal expropriation solely on the basis of
24
respondent's failure to compensate the claimants in a timely manner.1
The Bayindirtribunal, like the Saipem tribunal, confirmed that an expropriation claim is
"potentially applicable not only to tangible property but also to contractual and other
rights." 25
Also, the Glamis NAFTA tribunal took a strict interpretation that the deprivation required for an expropriation must render the investment effectively "useless," such that
"mere restrictions on the property rights do not constitute takings."' 26 The Bayindir tribunal placed particular reliance on the holding of the Tecmedl 27 award in making a similar
point.128
2. Fairand Equitable Treatment
It has been widely accepted by tribunals and commentators that the principle of good
faith underlies the FET standard,1 29 particularly with regard to the duty of states to respect investors' legitimate expectations. In this vein, the Siag tribunal provided a useful
summary of the content of the FET standard, stating:
The general, if not cardinal, principle of customary international law that States must
act in good faith is thus a useful yardstick by which to measure the Fair and Equitable
standard. While its precise ambit is not easily articulated, a number of categories of
frequent application may be observed from past cases. These include such notions as
Pak., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29 (Aug. 24, 2009); and EDF (Servs.) Ltd v. Rom., Award,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/13 (Oct. 2, 2009). Note that FET was the basis for claimants' claims in
five of the seven arbitrations (Siag, Glamis, Pantechniki,Bayindir, and EDF), with the claimant in Siag making
the only successful FET claim.
122. Funnekotter, supra note 121, T1 21, 26.
123. Id. 9 75.
124. See id. 1 101.
125. Bayindir,supra note 121, 1$ 441-442, 456. The Saipem tribunal held that claimant's "right to arbitrate
and the rights determined by the [ICC] Award are capable in theory of being expropriated." See Saipem,
supra note 121, T 122.
126. Glamis, supra note 5, T 357 (citing OECD, "IndirectExpropriation"andthe "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law 11 (OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv., 2004/4)).
127. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tedmed SA. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, 1 115 (May 29, 2003).
128. Bayindir, supra note 121, 9 443.
129. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
5-6, 144-47 (2008).
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transparency, protection of legitimate expectations, due process, freedom from dis30
crimination and freedom from coercion and harassment.1
Similarly, the EDF tribunal "share[d] the view expressed by other tribunals that one of
the major components of the FET standard is the parties' legitimate and reasonable ex3
pectations with respect to the investment they have made."' '
With respect to other aspects of the scope of the FET standard, the Bayindir tribunal
held that a breach of FET "need not necessarily arise out of individual isolated acts but
can result from a series of circumstances." 132 The tribunal also disagreed with Respondent's argument that the often-applied Tecmed v. Mexico award should be relegated in favor
of the Thunderbirdv. Mexico133 award as representing the preferred position on the issue of
34
whether FET has a high "egregiousness" threshold.1
In a particularly notable decision, the Glamis NAFTA tribunal 33 addressed the content
of FET as reflected in customary international -law, also relying on the Thunderbird
award.1 36 Although many tribunals and commentators have concluded that there is effectively no difference between the content of the customary and treaty standards, the Glamis
tribunal identified the customary standard as being so strict in scope that one observer
described the decision as a "clear break with the overwhelming jurisprudential consensus
that had been achieved over a decade on the issue."' 37 The Glamis tribunal particularly
3
relied on the 1926 award of the Mexican Claims Commission tribunal of Neer v. Mexico s
as representative of the "customary" standard, as well as concluding that the customary
39
standard has not evolved since this 1926 decision.1
3. Full Protection and Security
The Siag tribunal acknowledged that the full protection and security standard requires
that states exercise "due diligence" in preventing harm to an investment, 140 holding that
the failure of police to heed claimant's requests for protection from the expropriation of
its hotel investment, and the failure of respondent to return that investment after the
courts had struck down the expropriatory measures, supported the finding of a breach of
the full protection clause in the Italy-Egypt BIT.141
130. Siag, spra note 121, 1 450.
131. EDF (Serys.) Ltd., supra note 121, 1216.
132. Bayindir, supra note 121, 1 181. The Glamis tribunal reached an opposite conclusion, holding that for a
tribunal to address acts as a whole rather than individually, it would be necessary to additionally find some
form of intent by respondent. Glamis, supra note 5, 1 824-829.
133. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mex., Arbitral Award, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Jan. 26,
2006).
134. Bayindir, sipra note 121, 191 174, 179.
135. In the interest of full transparency, it should be disclosed that members of the firm Crowell & Moring
LLP were counsel to the claimants in the Glamis arbitration.
136. Glamis, supra note 5, 11 560, 614, 621, 623, 625.
137. See Todd Weiler and related discussion on OGEMID following the release of the Glamis award, 3 July
2009, OGEMID Archive, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com.
138. Neer v. Mex., 4 R.IA.A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926).
139. Glamis, supra note 5, 91 22, 600-604, 612-616, 627.
140. Siag, supra note 121, %450.
141. Id. T 448. Article 4(1) of the Italy-Egypt BIT provided: "Investments by nationals or companies of
either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection in the territory of the other Contracting Party." Id. 91445.
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The tribunal in Pantechniki raised the controversial question, "Should a state's international responsibility bear some proportion to its resources?"l 42 Other tribunals have answered this question in the affirmative, particularly with respect to FET claims.'143 While
the Pantechniki tribunal rejected this proposition as applied to a denial of justice, it accepted that there is a "modified objective standard" with respect to full protection and
security, subsequently rejecting the latter claim on the basis that the police were unable to
intervene, as opposed to having refitsed to intervene when asked (which would have provided a basis for the claim).144
4.

Damages Awards

No tribunals awarded punitive or moral damages during 2009. In Siag, the tribunal
rejected claimants' request for such damages, holding that an unlawful expropriation did
not warrant punitive or moral damages, which are "reserved for extreme cases of egregious
behavior."145 Similarly, Europe Cement held that an abuse of process was not enough to
trigger moral damages,146 which could only be justified by "exceptional circumstances
such as physical duress . . . ."147 Cementownia found that although "symbolic compensation for moral damages may indeed aim at indicating a condemnation for abuse of Process . . . the Arbitral Tribunal deems it more appropriate to sanction the Claimant with
48
respect to the allocation of costs."1

C.

ANNULMENT AND ENFORCEMENT

Ac-noNs

Four decisions were issued by ICSID ad hoc committees in 2009 involving the enforcement of ICSID awards against Argentina during the pendency of annulment proceedings.149 These decisions merit special attention in light of the ongoing speculation as to
whether-and how-increasing numbers of ICSID award creditors will receive payment
of the amounts owed to them by Argentina. In addition to the Argentina cases, the decision in the Malaysian HistoricalSalvors (MHS) annulment proceeding 50 was also notewor142. Pantechniki, supra note 121, 9 76.
143. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn Bhd & MTD Chile SA v. Chile, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
01/7, 1 171 (May 25, 2004).
76-83.
144. Pantechniki, supra note 121,
145. Siag, supra note 121, 1 545.
146. Eur. Cement Inv. & Trade S.A. v. Turk., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, IT 180181 (Aug. 13, 2009).
147. Id. 1 181.
148. Cementownia "Nowa Huta" S.A. v. Turk., Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, 1 171
(Sept. 17, 2009).
149. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Arg., Decision on Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 20, 2009); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg., Decision
on Request for Stay of Enforcement, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16 (Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter
Sempra Stay Request]; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg., Decision on Request for Termination of Stay of Enforcement of Award (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Sempra Stay Termination]; Continental Cas. Co. v. Arg., Decision
on Stay of Enforcement of Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9 (Oct. 23, 2009).
150. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay., Decision on Application for Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/05/10 (Feb. 28, 2009).
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thy, as only the third such decision of a "modern" ICSID ad hoc committee to
5
substantially annul an ICSID award.' '
1.

Decisions on Stays of Enforcement

Argentina-by far the most common respondent in ICSID cases filed to date-has
sought annulment in every case in which a final award has been rendered against it. Notably, in each of the cases where Argentina has sought annulment, it was granted an initial
stay of enforcement of the awards pending conclusion of the annulment proceeding. In
keeping with recent practice of annulment committees, these stays were granted without
Argentina being required to post any financial security.
In March and August 2009, respectively, the Sempra ad hoc committee became the first
to (1) require Argentina to post a financial security as a condition for continuation of a
52
stay,1 and (2) explicitly terminate a stay against Argentina during the pendency of an
54
53
Notably, the latter decision ran contrary to that of the Enron
annulment proceeding.
committee, which continued the stay in that case. Although the Enron decision has not
been published, it was apparently heavily relied upon by Argentina in contesting Sempra's
application.ISS
In Continental Casualty, the ad hoc committee affirmed the decisions of the committees
in Vivendi, Enron, and Sempra, in rejecting Argentina's argument that an ICSID award
could be subject, pursuant to Convention Article 54, to the provisions and mechanisms of
56
national law.1 Due to Argentina's position on this issue, the committee concluded that
there was "no prospect that Argentina will comply with its obligation under Article 53 of
57
Furthermore, like the Sempra
the ICSID Convention" if the award was not annulled.
committee, it found this to be a "fundamentally important consideration in determining
whether to impose a condition of security as a requirement for any stay of enforcement." 5 8 Ultimately, the Continental Casualty committee declined to terminate the stay or
to impose any condition of security, due to what it considered to be the special circum59
stances of the case.1 Nevertheless, its conclusions with regard to Argentina's non-compliance with the Convention-echoing those of the Sempra committee-may signal the
development of a new trend toward requiring Argentina to post a financial security in the
absence of special circumstances.
151. The other two decisions are Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg., Decision on Annulment,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3 (uly 3, 2002), and Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, Decision on Application for Annulment of Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 (Nov. 1, 2006).
152. Sempra Stay Request, supra note 149, 9 105.
153. Sempra Stay Termination, supra note 149, 1 23. The stay in the Vivendi annulment proceeding was also
presumably terminated automatically, upon expiration of the time limit set by the committee for Argentina's
fulfillment of conditions imposed upon its continuation. See Compaiifa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg.,
Decision on Stay of Enforcement, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, T 46C (Nov. 4, 2008).
154. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., supra note 149, 146.
155. Sempra Stay Termination, supra note 149, 91 9, 17.
156. Continental Cas. Co., supra note 149, 1 12.
157. Id.
158. Id. 1 13.
159. The committee placed emphasis on two factors: (1) both parties had cross-applied for annulment of
different aspects of the award, and (2) the amount of the award being contested was only $2.8 million. See id.
91 14-16.
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2. Decisions on Applications for Annulment
The committee in the MHS case became the third modern ad hoc committee to annul
an ICSID award in its entirety. Of these three modern annulments, two have now turned
on the same issue, namely, the tribunal's approach to the question of whether the claimant
had made an "investment" for purposes of the ICSID Convention. Notably, the two committees to decide this issue-the first in Mitchell and the second in MHS-reached what
were, in many ways, opposite conclusions.
On the one hand, the Mitchell committee annulled the tribunal's affirmation of jurisdiction ratione materiae, determining that the award was "incomplete and obscure as regards
what it considers an investment."160 In this regard, even though the Mitchell committee
found that "the elements identified by the Award for purposes of affirming the existence of
an investment fall well within the scope of application of the [BIT]," it opined that this
was not sufficient to "affirm the existence of an investment within the meaning of the
Washington Convention," because for that purpose "it is necessary for the contribution to
the economic development or at least the interests of the State. . to be somehow present
in the operation."t 61
On the other hand, the MHS committee annulled the tribunal's rejection of jurisdiction,
determining that the tribunal's analysis of the ratione materiae issue inappropriately "embroider[ed] upon questionable interpretations of the term 'investment' as found in Article
25(1) of the Convention," while "ignor[ing] or depreciat[ing] the importance of the jurisdiction" that had been "bestow[ed] upon ICSID" by the terms of the relevant BIT.162
The tribunal had declined jurisdiction on the basis that MHS's contractual endeavor to
locate and recover a valuable sunken cargo for the Government of Malaysia did not meet
certain implied requirements of an investment under the Convention, including, in particular, that the operation entail a "significant contribution" to the host State's economic
development.163 The MHS committee noted the controversy over the correct approach
to the issue of what, if anything, may be excluded from the definition of "investment"
under the ICSID Convention.1 64 Indeed, the controversy was manifest in the very circumstances of the decision, from which one of the committee members dissented in its
entirety. 165

160. Mitchell, supra note 151,
161. Id.

'1

'

40.

36, 39.

162. Malaysian Historical Salvors, supra note 150, 1 73.
163. Id.

22.

164. Id. 11 75-79.
165. See id. (Mohamed Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
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